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Does polarisation of opinions lead to polarisation of platforms?
The case of correlation neglect
Gilat Levy and Ronny Razin, LSE
Abstract: In this paper we question the common wisdom that more polarised voters
opinions imply larger policy polarisation. We analyse a voting model in which the source of
the polarisation in votersopinions is correlation neglect, that is, voters neglect the correlation
in their information sources. Our main result shows that such polarisation in opinions
does not necessarily translate to policy polarisation; when the electoral system is not too
competitive (that is, when there is some aggregate noise in the elections outcome), then
voters with correlation neglect may induce lower levels of policy polarisation compared with
rational electorates.
Recent empirical evidence shows that polarisation between the two major parties in the US
is on the rise (see Poole and Rosenthal, 1984, 1985, 2000). While there is a consensus about
the polarising of America, there are di¤erent and competing explanations for the causes of
this phenomenon (see a recent survey by Barber and McCarty 2013). One explanation that
has been put forward as a cause for polarisation in Congress is polarisation in votersopin-
ions. As Barber and McCarty (2013) put it, ...If voters are polarised, re-election motivated
legislators would be induced to represent the political ideologies of their constituents, result-
ing in a polarised Congress.While direct evidence about polarisation in votersopinions is
mixed,1 there are indications that voters are increasingly more attached to political parties
on an ideological basis. Abramowitz (2010) nds that voters that are most likely to par-
ticipate in politics compared to the average party identier tend to be more extreme, with
further polarisation among party activists and donors. But does increased polarisation of
votersopinions necessarily imply polarisation of policies?
In this paper we explore the link between voter polarisation and policy polarisation. We
focus on voters who have more polarised opinions as they neglect the correlation in their
information sources. This correlation neglect bias is explored in recent literature by, among
others, De Marzo et al (2003), Ortoleva and Snowberg (2015), Glaeser and Sunstein (2009)
and Levy and Razin (2015).2 Correlation neglect implies that voters have more polarised
1See Fiorina et al (2005), Abramowitz and Saunders (2008), Harbridge and Malhotra (2011) and Layman
and Carsey (2002).
2In the context of nancial markets, Eyster and Weizsacker (2012) conduct an experiment to show that
individuals neglect correlation when choosing a portfolio (see also Kallir and Sonsino 2009 and Enke and
Zimmermann 2013).
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beliefs as they are more condent in their information. We then ask whether increased polar-
isation in votersopinions, arising from correlation neglect, implies more policy polarisation.
To be more precise, we analyse a voting model in which voters have to choose between two
platforms, espoused by two strategic, policy-motivated, politicians. Each voters ideal policy
depends on her political preference parameter as well as on a common, unknown, state of
the world. The aggregate vote share along with an aggregate shock determine the political
outcome, via majority rule. The probability of winning is therefore increasing in a platforms
expected vote share.
Prior to voting, each voter receives signals about the state of the world. We assume that
while the di¤erent sources of information which generate the signals might be correlated,
voters are not necessarily aware of this. We distinguish between two types of voters. Rational
voters understand when the information they receive is correlated. Behavioural voters, on
the other hand, are not aware of the correlation, and hence, in expectations, have more
polarised ideal policies.
We rst illustrate how the more polarised ideal policies of the behavioural voters may imply
more informed voting. Intuitively, correlation neglect magnies the e¤ect of information on
individualsopinions. Individuals who might otherwise stick with the policy that accords
with the direction of their political preferences may be swayed to change their vote if they
believe that their information is su¢ ciently strong in the opposite direction. This implies that
behavioural voters base their vote more on their information rather than on their political
preference parameters.3
We then show that more polarised opinions in the behavioural electorates, and the more
informed voting they induce, a¤ect policy polarisation in two ways. One way corresponds
to the standard intuition in the literature, and arises through the e¤ect of vote shares on
the probability of winning. More informed voting implies that the expected vote share
for the right (left) policy in the right (left) state of the world is higher in the behavioural
electorate. But a decreasing marginal e¤ect of vote shares on the probability of winning
(or a weak aggregate shock) implies that politicians would polarise their platforms more in
the behavioural electorate. In other words, a right-wing politician would worry less about
deviating to the right as he has a su¢ ciently high vote share in the right state and, in any
case, only a small chance of being elected in the left state.4 We term this the vote share
e¤ect.
We nd another e¤ect however through which polarised opinions a¤ect policy polarisation
3In Levy and Razin (2015) we characterize the environments under which this results in better information
aggregation.
4This intuition is stated in Barber and McCarty (2013), ... the incentives for parties to take positions
that appeal to supporters of the other party will diminish. This leads to greater partisan polarization.This
e¤ect is also similar to those derived in Gul and Pesendorfer (2012) and Yuksel (2014), among others.
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and potentially in the opposite direction. This arises through the sensitivity of the vote
shares themselves to deviations or the marginal voter e¤ect. In the behavioural electorate,
voters are more condent in their information, and thus it is the more ideologically extreme
voters (in terms of their political preference parameter) who are the marginal voters that will
change their vote when a politician polarises. In the rational electorate on the other hand
such marginal voters are relatively moderate. The di¤erence between the two electorates
arises when information is correlated; if the ideologically extreme voters have a higher degree
of correlation in their information sources, then the expected vote shares in the behavioural
electorate become more sensitive to deviations. In this case, politicians would be less prone
to policy polarisation when facing the behavioural electorate as they would worry about
losing too many marginal voters.
We show then that policy polarisation can both increase or decrease when voters have
correlation neglect. When the electoral system is very competitive (modelled as a weak
aggregate shock), a candidates probability of winning is very sensitive to the level of his
expected vote shares. In this case the vote share e¤ect dominates and correlation neglect
leads to more polarisation of both opinions and policy platforms. When the electoral sys-
tem is relatively uncompetitive, the marginal voter e¤ect will play a bigger role and thus
correlation neglect may lead to more polarisation of opinions along with lower polarisation
of platforms.
We next endogenise the information sources that voters are exposed to, by assuming that
they can, at a cost, make their information sources more independent. We show that mod-
erates and extremists invest relatively less in the quality of their information compared with
intermediate voters.5 Endogenising the level of independent information that voters have
strengthens the result that polarisation of opinions does not necessarily lead to polarisation
of platforms. Specically, we show that the more extreme voters will invest less in the in-
dependence of their information. This, through the marginal voter e¤ect, implies that in
behavioural electorates expected vote shares are more sensitive to deviations and thus lower
polarisation may arise.
Finally we discuss some welfare implications of our results. As shown in Bernhardt, Dug-
gan and Squintani (2009), greater polarisation may be welfare improving as it provides
voters with better choice. In our analysis, the welfare benets of polarisation are increasing
in votersinformation. A behavioural electorate behaves as if it is more informed and thus
polarisation is desirable. We illustrate using an example how behavioural electorates may
5Having in mind our particular interpretation, one can relate our results above to the literature on voter
sophistication (see Bartels 1996, Weisberg and Nawara 2010). While some nd support for why extreme
voters are more politically savvy (Sidanius and Lau 1989) others show that it is the ideological centrists who
are the most sophisticated in their voting (Tomz and Van Houweling 2008).
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have higher welfare compared with rational ones.6
Our paper analyses the strategic response of politicians to changes in votersability to
process information. In this regard it is in line with Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita
(2014), who provide several examples under which behavioural biases might be benecial for
voters when one takes into account the strategic behaviour of politicians.
Our focus is on correlation neglect, a behavioural bias about which there is a growing
literature. In Ortoleva and Snowberg (2015) individuals receive a stream of signals, some
correlated. Their model implies that the higher is the level of correlation neglect of an
individual, the more extreme his beliefs will be. Glaeser and Sunstein (2009) model a similar
behaviour in a group setup, where agents ignore the correlation between theirsand others
information. They show that groups may perform worse than an individual decision maker,
and that greater polarisation and overcondence arises in groups.7 In Levy and Razin
(2015) we characterize distribution functions for which behavioural electorates induce better
information aggregation for the case of xed platforms and exogenously given information.
In this paper we analyse instead how each electorate, rational or behavioural, a¤ects the
choices of politicians. We also endogenise the level of correlation in the information sources
of the voters.
Some recent papers show how platform polarisation can arise when the public is more
informed or has more polarised preferences. Feddersen and Gul (2014) analyse a dynamic
model in which party polarisation and income inequality are positively correlated. Greater
inequality a¤ects the distribution of donors (whose contributions a¤ect the election result)
towards those that endorse less redistribution. Yuksel (2014) and Gul and Pesendorfer (2012)
show how changes in voterssources of information can a¤ect platform polarisation. Yuksel
(2014) focuses on specialisation in information gathering while Gul and Pesendorfer (2012)
focus on the e¤ects of competition in the media. Both generate an e¤ect which is similar to
the vote share e¤ect in our model, where a more informed electorate will encourage politicians
to polarise. In contrast, by focusing on polarisation of opinions that arises from a cognitive
bias of processing information, we show that the opposite can also arise. That is, in our
model, even when voting is more informed, platform polarisation might be lower.
The Model
Politicians and voters: There are two politicians, r and l; who choose platforms xr 2
[0; 1] and xl 2 [ 1; 0] to compete in the election. There is a continuum of voters, each
characterized by a political preference parameter vi; distributed uniformly on [ 1; 1]: The
6See also Martinelli (2006) and Degan (2006). Degan (2006) nds that polarisation increases information
acquisition by voters, as we do.
7In Glaeser and Sunstein (2009) information is shared in the group prior to making a decision. In our
model information is aggregated through a vote.
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ideal policy of voter i is vi + !; where ! 2 f 1; 1g is an initially unknown realisation of a
state of the world: The common prior is that each realisation occurs with equal probability.
Denote the political outcome by y and let y^ denote the policy that the voter votes for. We
assume that a voter maximizes the following utility function:
U(vi; !; y) + U(vi; !; y^)
where
U(vi; !; z) =  (! + vi   z)2:
The rst element implies that a voter derives utility from the political outcome matching
her ideal policy, and the second element implies that she also derives utility from her indi-
vidual vote matching her ideal policy. The parameter  > 0 denotes the weight the voter
puts on the rst term. Note that as we have a continuum of voters, voters are pivotal with
zero probability. The second element of their utility function will therefore induce them to
vote sincerely. We make two comments about the form of the utility function. First, as the
focus of this paper is on voters who are unable to process information correctly, we nd it
more suitable to consider sincere voting and abstract away from complicated strategic voting
considerations. Our results also hold however with strategic voting (on this see Levy and
Razin 2015). Second, instead of assuming the second part of the utility function, one can
directly assume that voters vote sincerely. This alternative modelling strategy will not a¤ect
most of our analysis. However, without this second incentive to vote correctly, individuals
will not invest in costly information. It therefore plays a role of simply motivating voters to
invest in information when we extend the model and allow them to do so.8
Given the above, a voter i votes for xr i¤
E![ (! + vi   xr)2]  E![ (! + vi   xl)2]:
Note that for all voters in [ 1; 1], if the platforms are symmetric so that xl =  xr; then
platform xr is the optimal policy in state ! = 1 and platform xl is the optimal policy in state
! =  1:
We assume that the two politicians have single-peaked policy preferences, given by a
quadratic loss function, which does not depend on ! (for simplicity). Let the ideal policy of
r (l) be zr = 1 (zl =  1). The utility of candidate j 2 fr; lg is then, for some  > 0:
 (zj   y)2:
The information structure: Voters will base their voting strategy on their political
preferences and on their beliefs about !:We assume that prior to voting, each voter i receives
8Other papers have also assumed a similar utility function as we do here. For some recent examples of a
similar approach, see Gul and Pesendorfer (2012) or Chan and Suen (2008).
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two private signals s1i ; s
2
i 2 f 1; 1g; each with accuracy q > 12 ; that is, Pr(sji = !j!) = q
for j 2 f1; 2g. Furthermore, with probability (vi); the two signals are fully correlated, and
with probability 1 (vi); they are conditionally independent. Note that this is the simplest
possible environment in which we can consider correlation neglect but our results generalize
to more complicated information structures. For now we only assume symmetry in the
distribution of  so that (vi) = ( vi): Other than that we allow for general functions (:);
including the possibility of independence between preferences and the level of correlation.
We later on endogenise the function (vi) and its symmetry properties.
In what follows we compare behavioural electorates to rational electorates. We assume
that a behavioural voter does not understand that the signals might be correlated. Such a
voter always believes that she has two (conditionally) independent signals. A rational voter,
on the other hand, is aware of the information structure and specically also fully recognizes
when the signals are correlated and when they are independent.9
Finally, we assume that at the time of choosing their platforms, the politicians do not have
additional information about the state of the world beyond the equal prior.
The political system: We assume some uncertainty in the elections outcome in order
to induce polarisation. We do so in the simplest possible way. Let Vx be the vote share for
some policy x (the vote share would depend on the type of the electorate and on the state
of the world). We assume that there is some noise in the political system so that policy x
is chosen with probability G(Vx), for some continuous and increasing function G which is
symmetric around a half (so that G(Vx) = 1   G(1   Vx)) and concave above a half (and
hence convex below a half). Figure 1 below presents examples of G :10
[FIGURE 1 HERE]
Note that the more concave is G; the more likely it is that a policy x would be chosen if
Vx >
1
2
: On the other hand, the less concave it is, the less this is su¢ cient. We can interpret
a more concave G as a more competitive electoral system, that is, one that is less subject
to noise and shocks. Below we provide an example that microfounds such family of G0s and
will serve as a leading example henceforth:
Example 1: Suppose that society is composed of N (odd) districts, where each district
has a continuum of voters. For simplicity assume that districts are identical so that voters
are distributed uniformly in each district as described above. This implies that the vote
9The assumption that a rational voter fully recognizes when the signals are correlated is made for sim-
plicity; we can assume instead that he uses the probability  in his Bayesian updating.
10One can extend this family to consider functions which are convex above a half. The concavity of G
allows for equilibrium existence and plays a role in polarisation as we show below.
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share for platform xj 2 fxl; xrg; Vxj ; would be identical across districts by the law of large
numbers. Assume that in each district k; a candidate for the party proposing platform xj
wins if Vxj > V xj + k; where k is an idiosyncratic district-noise, distributed uniformly
on [-1,1]. One example of such shocks is extreme weather events, which a¤ect turnout.11
Platform xj (or party j) wins the overall election if it wins a majority of the districts. The
probability that platform xj is elected is therefore
GN(Vxj) =
NX
k=N+1
2

N
k

(Vxj)
k(1  Vxj)N k: (1)
It is easy to verify that GN(V ) is a concave function above V > 0:5, symmetric around a
half (and hence convex for V < 1
2
) and moreover, that the larger is N; the more concave it
is (for V > 0:5):12 To see why, note that when N = 1; the noise  looms large. Achieving a
vote share greater than a half only guarantees a probability of being elected set at V . When
there are many districts though, the idiosyncratic district level shocks cancel each other out
on the aggregate. For large N; this implies that a vote share larger than a half guarantees
winning with probability almost one. A political system with a larger N can be interpreted
therefore as more competitive in the sense that it is more immune to idiosyncratic district
shocks.
Timing and equilibrium: In the rst stage, politicians choose their platforms. The
voters then receive their information and vote in the second stage. All voters vote sincerely
and the politicians best respond to each others choice given the forecasted vote of the
electorate.
Remark 1: Polarisation of opinions. In the above model the beliefs of all voters,
rational or not, will have ex ante the same mean. The ex ante variance however will be
di¤erent; beliefs will di¤er between rational voters and those with correlation neglect in
the second order stochastic dominance sense. To illustrate the polarisation of beliefs, we
now plot the ex ante distribution of beliefs in state ! = 1; for the parameters q = 0:75
and (v) = 0:75 for all v: The x axis represents the beliefs that a voter would have, and
the y axis represents the probability of having these beliefs. For example, a voter who
receives two contrasting signals will have beliefs 0:5; and this event arises with probability
11Recent empirical literature in Political Science has shown how weather a¤ects electoral outcomes. Gomez,
Hansford and Krauze (2007) examine the e¤ect of weather on voter turnout in 14 U.S. presidential elections
by using data from 22,000 U.S. weather stations, and nd that rain signicantly reduces voter participation
by a rate of just less than 1% per inch, while an inch of snowfall decreases turnout by almost .5%. Moreover,
they nd that poor weather benets the Republican partys vote share.
12When N !1; GN (V )! 1 for V > 0:5:
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2(1   )q(1  q) = 0:09; and so on. As can be seen below, the beliefs of behavioural voters
are more polarised:13
[FIGURE 2 HERE]
We next consider whether such greater polarisation of beliefs, and hence of expected ideal
policies, induces greater polarisation of platforms.
Votersbehaviour
We start by using backward induction and analyse the behaviour of voters in the two
societies. We will derive two preliminary results that will be important in determining the
vote share e¤ect and the marginal voter e¤ect later on. We will show that when the platforms
are symmetric, the expected vote share for the optimal policy (e.g., the right-wing policy
in the right-wing state), is higher in the behavioural electorate. Moreover, we will show
that marginal voters will be more extreme in the behavioural electorate compared with the
rational one.
Assume that xr =  xl: It is easy to see that a voter would vote for xr if he believes
that ! = 1 with a su¢ ciently high probability and for xl if he believes that ! =  1 with
a su¢ ciently high probability (where how high this probability has to be depends on the
voters preference parameter).
Next note that the voting behaviour of rational and behavioural voters di¤ers only when
voters receive the two fully correlated signals, (1,1) or (-1,-1). Consider rst a behavioural
voter, who (wrongly) believes he has two independent signals. Then there exists some cuto¤
v2; such that a voter would vote for xr when he has (1,1) and for xl when he has (-1,-1),
if his preference parameter v is in [ v2; v2]. Note that these voters would vote for xr with
probability q in state ! = 1 for example, which is the probability that the signal (which is
repeated) matches the state:Extreme voters, above v2 or below  v2; would vote with their
ideology, to xr and xl respectively, as even two opposite signals would not convince them
otherwise. Their vote is therefore not informative.
On the other hand, consider a rational voter who recognizes that the signals are correlated
and thus realizes he really has only one signal. Then there exists a cuto¤ v1; v1 < v2; such
that he votes for xr(xl) if his signal is 1(-1) and his preference parameter v is in [ v1; v1]:
Again, in state ! = 1; voting for xr would arise for these voters with probability q; the
probability that the signal matches the state. Rational voters above v1 or below  v1 who
have only one signal would vote with their ideology and not use their information.
13Note that in the gure, a rational voter holds the beliefs 0:25 and 0:75 with some probability while
a behavioural voter doesnt. This is because a rational voter is sometimes aware of the correlation in the
signals and therefore updates based on one signal only. This is not the case for the behavioural voter, who
always believes he has observed two independent signals.
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Finally, it is easy to derive that v1 = 2q   1 < v2 = 2q 1q2+(1 q)2 : The key observation is that
v1 < v2 as behavioural voters are more condent in their information.
Figure 3 shows the probability that di¤erent voters vote for the right-wing policy in the
right-wing state, if s2i and s
1
i are correlated:
[FIGURE 3 HERE]
There are two implications from the above. First, in the event in which the signals are
correlated, the marginal voters in the behavioural electorate are more extreme, at v2 and
 v2 instead of at v1 and  v1. These are the cuto¤s at which voters start ignoring their
information as their preference parameters become more extreme (vote for example to xr
with probability 1 instead of probability q): This will play a role in the marginal voter e¤ect
below. This is intuitive as the behavioural voters believe that they have two independent
signals instead of one and are thus more condent in their information.
Second, the above implies that the expected vote share for the optimal policy is higher in
the behavioural electorate. Intuitively, the condence of behavioural voters in their infor-
mation implies that more of them use information when voting rather than their political
preference parameters. To see this more precisely, consider again Figure 3. As can be seen
in the gure, when for example ! = 1; and the signals are fully correlated, intermediate
voters in [v1; v2] vote for xr with probability 1 when rational, and with probability q when
behavioural. In [ v2; v1]; voters vote for xr with probability 0 when rational and with
probability q when behavioural. By symmetry and as q > 1
2
, the expected aggregate vote
share for xr in state ! = 1 is larger for the behavioural voters.14 Formally, let V Jx (!) be
the vote share for policy x in state ! under electorate J 2 fR;Bg; that is, a rational or a
behavioural electorate respectively. We then have:
Lemma 1: For all xr =  xl; the vote share for the optimal policy is higher in the
behavioural electorate in both states, that is, V Bxr (1) > V
R
xr(1) >
1
2
; V Bxl ( 1) > V Rxl ( 1) > 12 :15
Note that in both electorates, the expected vote share for the optimal policy is larger than
a half as voters base their vote on some information, and those who do not, cancel each
other out. Still, di¤erent vote shares for the optimal policy in the two electorates will a¤ect
politiciansprobability of winning di¤erently, which will play a role in the vote share e¤ect
below.
Polarisation and correlation neglect
14Specically, it is larger by
R v2
v1
(v)(2q   1) 12dv > 0:
15As we show in Levy and Razin (2015), this arises more generally, and in both states of the world, in
societies which are su¢ ciently balanced between right and left wing voters.
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We now derive the equilibrium level of polarisation in the two electorates as chosen by the
politicians. We rst derive the equilibrium condition and show that the di¤erence between
the two electorates will be manifested in how polarising deviations a¤ect the probability of
winning. We then show how this change in probabilities of winning can be decomposed into
the marginal voter e¤ect and the vote share e¤ect. We then put these two e¤ects together
and derive our main result about polarisation.
Politiciansoptimal choice. Let r(xr; xl) =  (1 xr)2 ( (1 xl)2). The expected
utility of candidate r in electorate J 2 fR;Bg can be written as:
Pr J(r elected)r(xr; xl)  (1  xl)2;
where
Pr J(r elected) =
1
2
G(V Jxr(1)) +
1
2
G(V Jxr( 1)):
Given xl; politician r chooses xr and the rst order condition is:
@ Pr J(r elected)
@xr
r(xr; xl) +
@(r(xr; xl))
@xr
Pr J(r elected) = 0
As is standard in such models, when a politician considers deviating, a trade-o¤ arises
between her chances of being elected, and her utility conditional on being elected. If politician
r moves her platform further to the right, her utility will be higher conditional on being
elected, while her probability of being elected is reduced. The equilibrium balances these
two incentives.16
Evaluated at a symmetric equilibrium, the rst-order condition becomes
@ Pr J(r elected)
@xr
r(xr; xl) +
@(r(xr; xl))
@xr
1
2
= 0 (2)
It is easy to use Equation 2 to show (the proof of this and all results that follow are in the
appendix):
Proposition 1: For any electorate J 2 fR;Bg, there exists a unique pair of symmetric
equilibrium platforms (xJr ; x
J
l =  xJr ).
It is clear though from the above that when politicians choose their platforms, the only
di¤erence between the two electorates is how each electorate J a¤ects @ Pr
J (r elected)
@xr
: This can
be written as:
@ PrJ(r elected)
@xr
(3)
=
1
2
@G(V Jxr(1))
@V Jxr(1)
@V Jxr(1)
@xr
+
1
2
@G(V Jxr( 1))
@V Jxr( 1)
@V Jxr( 1)
@xr
16Second order conditions will always be satised, as the politiciansutility is concave, G is concave in V;
and V would be linear in xr:
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Note that as G is symmetric around a half, and as the symmetry of the model implies
V Jxr(1) = V
J
xl
( 1) = 1  V Jxr( 1); we can write it as:
@ Pr J(r elected)
@xr
=
1
2
@G(V Jxr(1))
@V Jxr(1)
(
@V Jxr(1)
@xr
+
@V Jxr( 1)
@xr
) (4)
As can be seen from Equation 4, the reduction in the probability of winning upon deviation
can be decomposed into two e¤ects. The rst e¤ect is the derivative of the probability of
winning with respect to a change in vote shares, @G(V
J
xr
(1))
@V Jxr (1)
. A higher vote share for the
optimal policy, or a more informed voting, may a¤ect di¤erently the actual probability of
winning, manifested by G. This e¤ect is denoted as the vote share e¤ect. The second e¤ect
is the sensitivity of vote shares to deviations, @V
J
xr
(!)
@xr
. This will be negative as some marginal
voters would be less inclined to vote for the deviating right-wing politician. This is what we
denote as the marginal voter e¤ect.
The vote share e¤ect. We rst consider the vote share e¤ect, i.e., that of @G(V
J
xr (1))
@V Jxr (1)
in Equation 4. By Lemma 1, evaluated in a symmetric equilibrium, we have that V Bxr (1) >
V Rxr(1): This then implies that
@G(V Bxr (1))
@V Bxr (1)
 @G(V Rxr (1))
@V Rxr (1)
as G00(V )  0 for V > 1
2
: As illustrated
in the gure below, the overall change in the probability of being elected will be smaller when
r deviates if the electorate is behavioural. This implies that this e¤ect induces candidates
to polarise more in the behavioural society as they worry less about the loss of the overall
probability of being elected:
[FIGURE 4 HERE]
This e¤ect is driven by the result of Lemma 1: More informed voting in the behavioural
electorate implies that a deviation by the politician will not damage much her chances of
winning in the correct state of the world, and similarly her chances of losing in the wrong
state of the world.
This e¤ect is in line with the intuition expressed in the literature that more polarised
beliefs, or a more informed public (which is what, on aggregate, a behavioural society is),
will induce more platform polarisation.17 As shown above, the concavity of the function G;
which can be interpreted as a feature of the electoral system, can exacerbate this e¤ect. Thus
a more competitive electoral system that induces a more concave G would have a stronger
such vote share e¤ect, while a less competitive system will have a weaker such e¤ect.
Example 1 revisited: When N = 1 for example, the di¤erential e¤ect identied above
does not arise as in this case G is linear and @G
N (V Jxr (1))
@V Jxr (1)
= 1 is xed for all V: Thus when
17See Barber and McCarty (2013).
11
N = 1 there will be no such di¤erence between rational and behavioural electorates: More
generally, using Equation 1, we have that
@GN(V Jxr(1))
@V Jxr(1)
= N [V Jxr(1)(1  V Jxr(1))]
N 1
2
for some N increasing in N: As by Lemma 1 V Jxr(1) > 0:5;
@GN (V Jxr (1))
@V Jxr (1)
is decreasing in V Jxr(1)
as expected. Moreover:
@GN (V Rxr (1))
@V Rxr (1)
@GN (V Bxr (1))
@V Bxr (1)
=
V Rxr(1)(1  V Rxr(1))
V Bxr (1)(1  V Bxr (1))
N 1
2
 1;
for all N  1: Specically, it equals 1 for N = 1; greater than 1 otherwise, and goes to
innity for a large enough N:
The marginal voter e¤ect. We now consider the marginal voter e¤ect, i.e., how the
vote shares change in the two types of electorates. Consider again only the event where the
signals are correlated which is what di¤erentiates the two electorates. Note that following
a deviation of r to the right, all cuto¤s, v1; v1; v2 and  v2; move to the right as voters
become less inclined to vote for xr:
[FIGURE 5 HERE]
Consider the behavioural voters rst (and recall that we x ! = 1). When the signals are
correlated, a voter in  v2 moves from voting right with probability q to voting right with
probability 0, and a voter in v2 moves from voting to xr with probability 1 to voting xr with
probability q. All changes around the v1 and  v1 cuto¤s are neutral as voters in this region
behave in the same way below and above the cuto¤s. Thus for the behavioural voters the
overall change in the vote share -on both the right and the left- amounts to a lower vote
share in the order of  ( v2)q + (v2)(q  1) =  (v2): For the rational voters this change,
analogously, amounts to  ( v1)q + (v1)(q   1) =  (v1): The change for such electorate
arises at the point in which voters change their behaviour when they have one signal, which
is v1 and  v1:
More generally, in terms of the di¤erence between the two electorates, it is more moderate
voters that are sensitive to deviations when we consider the rational votersresponse, and the
more extreme voters that are sensitive to a policy deviation when we consider the behavioural
voters response. The reason is that behavioural voters believe that their information is
stronger than what it really is, and thus change their actions only when their preference
parameter is strong enough. As the di¤erence between the two electorates is manifested only
when the signals are correlated, what is important therefore is the degree of correlation in
the information sources of the di¤erent marginal voters in each electorate. Formally:
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Lemma 2: @V
J
xr
(!)
@xr
 0 and @V Bxr (!)
@xr
  @V Rxr (!)
@xr
= 1
4
((v1)  (v2)):
In words, following a deviation to the right, the vote share for xr will be reduced less in a
rational society compared with a behavioural society if and only if (v1) < (v2):
Policy polarisation. We have identied two e¤ects that di¤erentiate how the probability
of a politician to be elected changes when she deviates in a behavioural and a rational
electorate. Both e¤ects analysed above relate to the observation that behavioural voters
have more polarised opinions. More polarised opinions imply a higher vote share for the
policy that matches the state of the world (the vote share e¤ect). More polarised opinions is
also behind the observation that the voters who are sensitive to deviations are more extreme
in the behavioural electorate (the marginal voter e¤ect).
We can now bring these two e¤ects together. If a deviation of the r politician to the
right brings about a stronger reduction in the probability of winning in one electorate, then
the politician will be less inclined to polarise, resulting in relative policy moderation in this
electorate.
If (v1)  (v2); the informed voting and the marginal voter e¤ects are in line, implying
that
@ PrR(r elected)
@xr
<
@ PrB(r elected)
@xr
< 0;
On the other hand when (v1) < (v2); the opposite result might arise. Consider for
example a function G whose derivative is not too responsive to the di¤erent vote shares, for
example when G(V ) = V: In this case the vote share e¤ect is the same in both electorates (as
the derivative does not depend on V ); while the marginal voter e¤ect looms large implying
that:
0 >
@ PrR(r elected)
@xr
>
@ PrB(r elected)
@xr
:
We can then use the above to deduce:
Proposition 2: Compared with a rational electorate, (i) the equilibrium in a behavioural
electorate has more platform polarisation if (v1)  (v2); (ii) the equilibrium in a behav-
ioural electorate has less platform polarisation if (v1) < (v2) and the political system is
not too competitive.
Again, let us use Example 1 to illustrate the result. In this case we have that (for some
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constant ):
j@ PrR(r elected)
@xr
j
j@ PrB(r elected)
@xr
j
< (>)1,

+ 0:25((v1)  (v2)) > (<)
V Rxr(1)(1  V Rxr(1))
V Bxr (1)(1  V Bxr (1))
N 1
2
:
As the right-hand-side is (weakly) larger than 1, if (v2) < (v1) polarisation must be smaller
in the rational electorate. On the other hand, when (v2) > (v1); and as the right-hand-side
equals 1 for N = 1; and converges to innity for large N; the result as in the proposition
follows.
Thus, polarisation of opinions induced by correlation neglect does not necessarily induce
polarisation of platforms by candidates. It is the interaction between how sensitive is the
election outcome to the vote shares, and how sensitive is the vote share to deviations, which
determines the overall e¤ect on polarisation. The rst e¤ect implies that behavioural elec-
torates would induce more polarisation while the latter e¤ect implies that for (v1) < (v2),
rational electorates might induce more polarisation.
One intuition would imply that it has to be that (v1) < (v2) : more extreme voters might
invest less in their information, or may worry less about the quality of their information.
The degree of the correlation in their information sources may therefore be higher. In the
next section we provide a model to endogenise (v) and we show that indeed (v1) < (v2).
Extension: endogenous levels of correlation
Voters take active decisions relating to the sources of information they are exposed to:
Voters choose how much time to invest in learning about political issues, they choose whom
to speak with, what to read or watch. They can also choose between di¤erent news outlets.
Some papers, such as the free papers that are distributed in train stations and on buses, tend
to reprint bits of news from other sources and have very little original content. Expensive
broadsheets or magazines, would typically o¤er a more investigative approach and might
provide an independent source of information to the reader, compared to what he might
hear or read in other outlets. In this section we allow voters to invest in the quality of their
information which we interpret as the degree of independence of their information sources.
While this is interesting in itself, we will also show that this implies that (v1) < (v2);
which strengthens our result that behavioural electorates can induce less polarisation.
Specically, we make the following changes to the model. Assume that prior to receiving
her information, a voter i can decrease the level of correlation (vi) or in short i by investing
according to the cost function c(1 i); with c0; c00 > 0. If a voter does not invest, then i = 1.
Individuals make their investment decisions conditional on vi; xl; xr and q: For simplicity,
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we assume that when considering how much to invest, a voter with correlation neglect is not
aware that when she will actually observe the signals, she will misinterpret their sources.
Our results also hold when voters are aware that they may misinterpret their information.18
The rest of the model remains the same.
We start by considering the model with xed symmetric platforms, xr = x and xl =  x;
and then proceed to endogenise the platforms.
Voters know that given their i; they will receive signals and vote optimally, yielding an ex
ante random policy choice y^(i). They choose then i to maximizeE!U(vi; !; y^(i)) c(1 i):
That is, they maximize the probability that they themselves vote for the optimal policy,
minus the cost of their investment.
Note that as behavioural voters are not aware of their correlation neglect, and believe that
they will recognize when the signals are correlated and when they are not, they will invest in
exactly the same level of independent information as rational voters do. When deciding on
their degree of independence of information sources, all voters therefore compute the benet
of having two independent signals compared with just one signal and compare it to the cost.
We therefore have the following:
Lemma 3: Let xr = x =  xl and consider all types with vi  0 (types with vi < 0
are characterized symmetrically). For both rational and behavioural voters, the degree of
independent information that a voter i has, 1 (vi); increases in vi for vi 2 [0; v1]; decreases
in vi for vi 2 [v1; v2]; and is 0 for vi  v2: Also, for all i, (vi) decreases in the degree of
polarisation x.
Consider rst moderate voters (with v > 0 but below v1).Getting more independent
information implies that they will vote more often for xr; which is the platform that accords
more with their political preferences. To see why, note that with one signal they vote to the
left whenever this signal indicates that the state is -1, but with two signals they do so only
when the two signals are -1.19 In this region therefore, the stronger is the political preference
to the right, the more investing in information is favourable.
Intermediate voters on the other hand will vote to the right when they have only one
signal and thus investment in information increases their probability of actually voting to
the left. The more ideological they are, the less attractive this is, and hence investment in
information is decreasing in their type in this region. Finally, as the second signal does not
a¤ect the voting decisions of the most extreme voters, they do not invest at all in the quality
18In such a case, voters may actually invest in better quality of information (higher degree of independence)
in order to protect themselves from being fooled. Thus all such voters invest more (weakly) in information
compared with rational voters, which implies that all our results follow.
19When the signals are di¤erent, (-1,1), they do not learn anything and hence vote for xr; let alone when
the signals are (1,1).
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of information. Figure 6 below graphs theM-shaped independent information level 1   i
given the ideology vi :
[FIGURE 6 HERE]
We now consider endogenous platforms. The only potential di¤erence in the analysis
when the quality of information is endogenous is that individuals will change their invest-
ments when candidates change their platforms. In line with Lemma 3, when there is more
polarisation, voters invest more because their loss from taking a wrong decision is higher.
This implies that when a candidate deviates to a more extreme platform, voting becomes
more informative. As we show in the proof however, this e¤ect cancels out as ex-ante, it
equally pulls the vote shares in opposing directions for the di¤erent states of the world. In
other words, the additional votes that a right-wing candidate receives in state ! = 1 (as
voters are more informed) equals the reduction in votes that she receives in ! =  1: This
implies that the analysis boils down to the e¤ects identied in the previous section.
Moreover, from Lemma 3 we know that (v1) < (v2) = 1. This arises as the type in v2
nds information of very little use, whereas a moderate voter in v1 changes his behaviour
with information and thus nds it useful to invest in the quality of information. Therefore,
using similar arguments as in Proposition 2 we can show,
Proposition 3: With endogenous information investment (v1) < (v2); and therefore if
the electoral system is not too competitive, then for any equilibrium in the model with rational
voters, there is an equilibrium with less polarisation in the model with behavioural voters. If
the electoral system is too competitive, the opposite arises.20
Discussion: welfare implications
In this section we discuss some of the welfare implications of correlation neglect. As the
analysis of this paper centres on polarisation, we start by noting that the level of desired
polarisation is related to how informed the electorate is. When voters are fully informed,
they would rather have full polarisation at xr = 1 =  xl:When voters have no information,
they would not want to take the risk involved in large polarisation. The more information
the electorate has, the more polarisation is attractive.
Note that were the platforms xed, for a high enough ; behavioural electorates would
enjoy a higher welfare as the political outcome would be better at information aggregation.21
20It is now the case that multiple equilibria may arise as the vote shares will be a function of (v); itself
a function of xr and xl:
21Recall that  is the weight in the utility function on the political outcome being the optimal one. Voters
have also utility from voting themselves for the optimal policy, which must be higher in a rational society
for xed platforms, as only such voters use correctly their information.
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Once we endogenise platforms, such welfare analysis becomes more complicated as polarisa-
tion can potentially increase or decrease in each electorate. When information is endogenous,
another complication arises, as a more informed vote such as in the behavioural electorate
might induce more polarisation in some cases, while more polarisation will induce more in-
vestment in information (that is, lower (v) for all v), as shown in Lemma 3. It is not clear
however that the higher level of information the voters would have would be su¢ cient to
overcome the risk inherent in polarisation. In addition, with di¤erent degrees of polarisation,
the cost of information acquisition would also be di¤erent for each society.
We now use an example to illustrate the relevant trade-o¤s for welfare calculations, dis-
cussed above. It provides a numerical calculation of the equilibria and its welfare properties
for the two electorates when information and platforms are endogenous and we vary the com-
petitiveness of the electoral system (the exact calculations are provided in the appendix).
Example 1 revisited: Suppose that q = 0:75; c(1   ) = 2(1   )2; that G is as in
Example 1, that N = 1 and that platforms are xed at xr = 0:5 =  xl: The vote share for
the correct outcome for the behavioural and for the rational electorate is  0:7 and  0:628
respectively. The cost of information is the same in both electorates, and as a result the
welfare of a behavioural electorate is higher for a high enough : Specically, we have that
 > 0:522:
Suppose now that platforms are endogenous and that the politicians utility is Uj(y) =
 2(zj y)2. The unique equilibrium for the behavioural electorate still has xBr =  xBl = 0:5
with the correct vote share at 0:7. For rational voters, xRr =  xRl = 0:5265 in the unique
equilibrium. Rational voters invest slightly more in information but the correct vote share
is not much higher at 0:629. Thus the welfare of a behavioural electorate is still higher for
a high enough : Specically, we need  > 0:538. Note that we need a higher  here as
the higher polarisation as well as the higher investment in information by rational voters is
valued by the voters through their utility from matching their actual individual vote to their
ideal policy.
Suppose now that we have more than one district. When N = 5; we have that xBr = 0:43
and xRr = 0:4 and thus behavioural voters induce more polarisation. Still, similar results
arise and we need  > 0:23: To see why the cuto¤ for  can be so low, note that the
rational individuals have much lower information aggregation as they invest less, and also
the di¤erence in the vote shares is magnied with a concave function. Thus the optimal
policy is more likely to be chosen in the behavioural electorate compared to the cases above.
Conclusion
In this paper we study the relation between polarisation in votersopinions to polarisation
in the policy choices of politicians. We focus on an environment in which polarisation in
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votersopinions arises due to correlation neglect, i.e., the failure to take into account that
di¤erent information sources might be correlated. We show that increased voter polarisation
doesnt necessarily imply more policy polarisation. In particular, we show that when the
political system is relatively uncompetitive, voter polarisation might even imply policy mod-
eration. These results provide a theoretical critique to some views espoused in the literature
that polarisation of policies arises as a result of voter polarisation. Our approach shows
that it is important to model the source of polarisation in opinions and the features of the
political system in order to derive whether such a link exists.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: Note that the equilibrium can be dened by the pair of rst
order conditions. Note that given the concavity of the politicians utility and G; and the
linearity of V; we have that the rst order conditions are su¢ cient for a continuous best
response function for each politician, dened on a compact set. Moreover, as the cuto¤s v1
and v2 do not depend on the degree of polarisation, the best response functions are linear (as
the vote shares will not depend on the degree of polarisation). A unique Nash equilibrium
therefore exists. Symmetry follows from the symmetric model.
Proof of Lemma 2: The di¤erence between the two voting behaviours occur only in
[v1 + x^; v2 + x^] and in [ v2 + x^; v1 + x^] where x^ = xr+xl2 is the mid point between the two
platforms in some equilibrium: Moreover, in these regions, when signals are independent,
voters in the two electorates behave in the same way. Thus, letting A(1) denote equal
behaviour in both societies in state ! = 1, we have (recall that f(v) = 1
2
):
V Bxr (1)=A(1) +
Z  v1+x^
 v2+x^
(v)q
1
2
dv +
Z v2+x^
v1+x^
(v)q
1
2
dv;
V Rxr(1)=A(1) +
Z v2+x^
v1+x^
(v)
1
2
dv
and therefore (note that @x^
@xr
= 1
2
and that we evaluate the derivative at x^ = 0) :
@V Bxr (1)
@xr
=
@A(1)
@xr
+
1
4
q(( v1)  ( v2) + (v2)  (v1)) = @A(1)
@xr
;
@V Rxr(1)
@xr
=
@A(1)
@xr
+
1
4
((v2)  (v1))
which implies the result in the Lemma. It is easy to show how the derivation holds also
when w =  1; as the di¤erence above does not depend on the state of the world.
Proof of Lemma 3: Trivially voters with v > v2 will not change their action when
getting more information and will therefore choose  = 1:
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Denote the level of polarisation in a symmetric equilibrium by x; that is, xr = x =  xl:
We now look at voters with vi < v1: Their indirect utility from some  is (note that this is
the same for rational individuals and behavioural individuals who think they are rational):
0:5( (q + (1  )(1  (1  q)2))(1 + v   x)2   ((1  q) + (1  )(1  q)2)(1 + v + x)2)
+0:5( ((1  q) + (1  )(1  q2))( 1 + v   x)2   (q + (1  )q2)( 1 + v + x)2)
The marginal benet from  is:
0:5( (q   1 + (1  q)2))(1 + v   x)2   ((1  q)  (1  q)2)(1 + v + x)2)
+0:5( ((1  q)  (1  q2))( 1 + v   x)2   (q   q2)( 1 + v + x)2) =
 4xvq(1  q)
(Note that this is negative as a higher  reduces the information value). We then have
c0(1  ) = 4xvq(1  q)
with (v) decreasing in v for these types.
We now describe intermediate voters. Their indirect utility from some  is:
0:5( (+ (1  )(1  (1  q)2))(1 + v   x)2   (1  )(1  q)2(1 + v + x)2)
+0:5( (+ (1  )(1  q2))( 1 + v   x)2   (1  )q2( 1 + v + x)2)
The marginal benet from  is:
2x
 
v   2q + 2q2v   2qv + 1
we therefore have that
c0(1  ) = 2x (v( 1 + 2q(1  q)) + 2q   1)
note that here (v) increases with v and that we have continuity at v1 and at v2: Finally, it
is easy to see the comparative statics as described in the Lemma.
Proof of Propositions 2 and 3:
We rst consider an analogue of Lemma 2 for the case of endogenous :
Lemma A2:
@V R(1)
@xr
= 1
4
(v1) +
Z v2
v1
@(v)
@xr
(1  2q)1
2
dv;
@V R( 1)
@xr
= 1
4
(v1) 
Z v2
v1
@(v)
@xr
(1  2q)1
2
dv;
@V B(1)
@xr
= 1
4
=
@V B( 1)
@xr
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(note that (v2) = 1 in the case of an endogenous ):
Proof of Lemma A2: Given Lemma 2, we only need to add the derivative of the vote
shares with respect to the endogenous (v); evaluated at the midpoint x^ = 0:
V Rxr(1) =R v1+x^
0
((v)q + (1  (v))(1  (1  q)2))1
2
dv+R 0
 v1+x^((v)q + (1  (v))q2)12dv+
+
R v2+x^
v1+x^
((v) + (1  (v))(1  (1  q)2)1
2
dv+R  v1+x^
 v2+x^ (1  (v))q2 12dv +
R 1
v2+x^
1
2
dv
V Bxr (1) =R v1+x^
0
((v)q + (1  (v))(1  (1  q)2))1
2
dv+R 0
 v1+x^((v)q + (1  (v))q2)12dv+
+
R v2+x^
v1+x^
((v)q + (1  (v))(1  (1  q)2)1
2
dv+R  v1+x^
 v2+x^ ((v)q + (1  (v))q2)12dv +
R 1
v2+x^
1
2
dv
First, given the specication in Lemma 2, we nd from the above that all common elements
are 0, that is, @A(1)
@xr
= @A( 1)
@xr
= 0: We now proceed to take the derivative w.r.t. (v) :
For V Rxr(1) this equals:R v1
0
@(v)
@xr
(q   1 + (1  q)2)1
2
dv+R 0
 v1
@(v)
@xr
(q   q2)1
2
dv +
R v2
v1
@(v)
@xr
(1  2q)1
2
dv
=
R v2
v1
@(v)
@xr
(1  2q)1
2
dv
For V Rxr( 1) this equals:R v1
0
@(v)
@xr
(1  q   1 + q2)1
2
dv+R 0
 v1
@(v)
@xr
(1  q   (1  q)2)1
2
dv   R v2
v1
@(v)
@xr
(1  2q)1
2
dv
=   R v2
v1
@(v)
@xr
(1  2q)1
2
dv
and for V Bxr (1) and V
B
xr ( 1) this derivative equals 0. In fact, as the accuracies of the two
signals are the same, the aggregate vote share for the behavioural agents does not depend
on  (in the symmetric distribution (v) case). Putting together the results in Lemma 2 (for
exogenous ) and the derivatives w.r.t. (v) proves the Lemma.
Lemma A3: For both endogenous and exogenous (v); when G is symmetric, the sym-
metric equilibrium rst order condition for symmetric xr; xl is
@G(V Jxr(1))
@V Jxr(1)
2K JUr(x r; x l)+
@Ur(xr)
@xr
1
2
= 0 (5)
where KB =  1
4
(v2) and KR =  14(v1):
Proof of Lemma A3: This follows from the symmetry of the model in the state of
the world, the symmetric equilibrium, and the symmetry of G which imply together that
@G(V Jxr (1))
@V Jxr (1)
=
@G(V Jxr (1 ))
@V Jxr ( 1)
: With the last statement of Lemma A2, Lemma A3 follows.
As Equation 5 holds for both the case of an endogenous  and the case of an exogenous ;
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Proposition 3 will be a special case of Proposition 2: We are now ready to prove a general
version of Proposition 2.
Suppose rst that (v1) > (v2): Consider an equilibrium of the rational model xRr ; x
R
l :
Evaluated at these points, we would have 0 > @G(V
Bxr(1))
@V Bxr (1)
KB >
@G(V Rxr (1))
@V Rxr (1)
KR because: (a)
V Bxr (1) > V
R
xr(1) by Lemma 1 implying by the properties ofG that 0  @G(V
Bxr(1))
@V Bxr (1)
 @G(V Rxr (1))
@V Rxr (1)
;
(b) 0 > KB > KR as we have that (v1) > (v2). Thus we will have more polarisation with
behavioural societies.
Suppose now that (v1) < (v2) (as is the case for Proposition 3). We then haveKB < KR.
Consider G(V ) = V: We then have that @G(V
J
xr
(1))
@V Jxr (1)
= 1 but KB < KR < 0 implying that at
some equilibrium xRr ; x
R
l of the rational model, when we evaluate the rst-order condition of
the behavioural model at these values, we have that the lhs of Equation 5 is smaller than
that of the rational model and thus negative (as for the rational it is zero in the postulated
equilibrium). We will have therefore less polarisation with behavioural voters.22 Note that
when G is not too concave and close to the linear one, the result above would hold insuring
robustness.
Note that in the case of Proposition 3, we cannot guarantee uniqueness any more as 
will be a function of the platforms, and the vote shares are a function of . In any case,
consider a linear G: In this case the derivative of G is xed at 1 and so (v1) > (v2); and
for all equilibria we have that the behavioural electorate induces less polarisation. That this
arises for other non linear G but still not too concave can be shown as in the example below:
When G is su¢ ciently concave though, it will be the case for any equilibrium as before that
 < 1 (note that this arises as (v1) > 0 always) and thus polarisation will be larger in the
behavioural electorate.
Calculations for the example:
Note that for moderate voters:
2(1  ) = 4xvq(1  q)
and for intermediate voters:
2(1  ) = 2x (v( 1 + 2q(1  q)) + 2q   1)
Case 1: Exogenous platforms x = 0:5
22As KB and KR are bounded from zero, we can also nd a G such that @G(V
B(1))
@V B(1)
KB > @G(V
R(1))
@V R(1)
KR
and there will be an equilibrium with more polarisation when voters are behavioural for this G.
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First note for behavioural voters, the vote share for the right option isZ 0
 v2
((v)q + (1  (v))q2f(v)dv +
Z v2
0
((v)q + (1  (v))(1  (1  q)2)f(v)dv +
Z 1
v2
f(v)dv
=
Z v2
0
(2(v)q + (1  (v))(1  (1  q)2 + q2)f(v)dv +
Z 1
v2
f(v)dv
=
Z v2
0
qdv +
Z 1
v2
0:5dv = 0:5 + v2(q   0:5)
This therefore only depends on q: For q = 0:75; this is 0:7: Thus for all x endogenous and
exogenous this would be the case.
For rational voters it isZ  v1
 v2
(1  (v))q2f(v)dv +
Z 0
 v1
((v)q + (1  (v))q2)f(v)dv
+
Z v1
0
((v)q + (1  (v))(1  (1  q)2)f(v)dv +
Z v2
v1
((v) + (1  (v))(1  (1  q)2)f(v)dv
+
Z 1
v2
f(v)dv
=
Z v1
0
(2(v)q + (1  (v))(1  (1  q)2 + q2)f(v)dv
+
Z v2
v1
((v) + (1  (v))(1  (1  q)2 + q2)f(v)dv +
Z 1
v2
f(v)dv
=
1
2
+
1
2
(2q   1)v2   (2q   1)1
2
Z v2
v1
(v)dv
Thus (recall that v1 = 2q   1 and v2 = 2q 1q2+(1 q)2 ):
V Rxl (1)=V =
1
2
+
1
2
(2q   1) 2q   1
q2 + (1  q)2   (2q   1)
1
2
Z 2q 1
q2+(1 q)2
2q 1
dv
V Bxl (1)=U =
1
2
+
1
2
(2q   1) 2q   1
q2 + (1  q)2
The welfare of the behavioural voters in state ! = 1; N = 1 (so the probability of election
is U), is:
 G(U) R 1 1(1 + v   x)20:5dv   (1 G(U)) R 1 1(1 + v + x)20:5dv
  R 2q 1
0
(1  r)2dv   R 2q 1q2+(1 q)22q 1 (1  )2dv
  R   2q 1q2+(1 q)2 1 (1 + v + x)20:5dv   R 1 2q 1
q2+(1 q)2
(1 + v   x)20:5dv
  R 1 2q  2q 1
q2+(1 q)2
((q + (1  )q2)(1 + v   x)2 + ((1  q) + (1  )(1  q2))(1 + v + x)2)0:5dv
  R 0
1 2q((rq + (1  r)q2)(1 + v   x)2 + (r(1  q) + (1  r)(1  q2))(1 + v + x)2)0:5dv
22
  R 2q 1q2+(1 q)22q 1 ((q+(1 )(1 (1 q)2))(1+v x)2+((1 q)+(1 )(1 q)2)(1+v+x)2)0:5dv
  R 2q 1
0
((rq+(1 r)(1 (1 q)2))(1+v x)2+(r(1 q)+(1 r)(1 q)2)(1+v+x)2)0:5dv
The welfare of rational voters in this case is:
 G(V ) R 1 1(1 + v   x)20:5dv   (1 G(V )) R 1 1(1 + v + x)20:5dv
  R 2q 1
0
(1  r)2dv   R 2q 1q2+(1 q)22q 1 (1  )2dv
  R   2q 1q2+(1 q)2 1 (1 + v + x)20:5dv   R 1 2q 1
q2+(1 q)2
(1 + v   x)20:5dv
  R 1 2q  2q 1
q2+(1 q)2
((1  )q2(1 + v   x)2 + (+ (1  )(1  q2))(1 + v + x)2)0:5dv
  R 0
1 2q((rq + (1  r)q2)(1 + v   x)2 + (r(1  q) + (1  r)(1  q2))(1 + v + x)2)0:5dv
  R 2q 1q2+(1 q)22q 1 ((+ (1  )(1  (1  q)2))(1 + v   x)2 + ((1  )(1  q)2)(1 + v + x)2)0:5dv
  R 2q 1
0
((rq+(1 r)(1 (1 q)2))(1+v x)2+(r(1 q)+(1 r)(1 q)2)(1+v+x)2)0:5dv
Plugging for the parameters in the example we have that the behavioural electorates
welfare is  1:183 3  1:001 5 and Rational electorate welfare is  0:926 92  1:326 3; from
which the result follows.
Case 2: Endogenous platforms:
For the behavioural electorate the rst-order condition is
 2(0:25)4x+ 4(1  x)1
2
= 0 (6)
and the solution is x = 0:5; and so the welfare calculation remain as above.
For rationals the rst-order condition is:
 2(0:25)(x ((2q   1) (2q (q   1) + 1)  2q + 1) + 1)4x+ 4(1  x)1
2
= 0 (7)
We then have that xRr = 0:526
Computing as above the welfare of rationals it is  0:917 75  1:339 2:
We now consider N = 5:
The rst-order condition for behavioural is:
 2(0:25)(30)U2(1  U)24x+ 4(1  x)1
2
= 0 (8)
and the solution is xBr = 0:43; and for rational it is:
 2(0:25)(30)V 2(1  V )2(x ((2q   1) (2q (q   1) + 1)  2q + 1) + 1)4x+ 4(1  x)1
2
= 0 (9)
with the solution being xRr = 0:397:
Computing again the welfare in both cases we get the result on : Specically the behav-
ioural welfare is  1:018  0:938 73; and the rational welfare is  0:974 89  1:126 7:
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